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This bachelor thesis looks into the topic of China and United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. The aim is to show China’s changing role 
with respect to its ideological policies and principles, as well as to its 
interests and capabilities. A special attention will be paid to major 
shifts in China’s attitude and the reasons for them, as demonstrated on 









Tato práce se zabývá Čínou a její rolí v mírových operacích 
Organizace spojených národů. Cílem je ukázat proměny role 
s ohledem jak na čínské ideologické politiky a principy, tak na její 
zájmy a schopnosti. Zvláštní pozornost bude věnována důležitým 
zvratům v čínském přístupu a jejich příčinám, které budou ukázány na 
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1.1. An overall introduction 
The role the PRC plays in the United Nations’ peacekeeping 
operations is a topic has not yet attracted general attention. This is a 
pity, though. The changes in Chinese approach and behaviour towards 
UN peacekeeping reflect changes both in domestic and international 
affairs, and comply also with changes in China’s status. 
Most scholars researching PRC foreign policy, modern history or 
military often make only minor comments on China’s role in this area 
and very few of them seem to realise its importance in Chinese rapid 
development we have been witnessing. There are exceptions, though. 
The International Crisis Group, a security research non-governmental 
organisation, composed an excellent work “China’s Growing Role in 
UN Peacekeeping” in 2009. This report was preceded by a paper of 
He Yin, an Associate Professor at a Chinese peacekeeping training 
centre and former peacekeeper. However, their excellent works pay 
little attention to ideological background. This blank spaced filled to a 
certain extent Gill and Reilly with their article “Sovereignty, 
Intervention and Peacekeeping: A View from Beijing”. This work 
dedicates enough space to Chinese ideological principals but 
concentrates on the principle of state sovereignty at the expense of 
many Chinese interests or other principles. 
 
The aim of this bachelor thesis is to describe the nature of UN 
peacekeeping itself and the role of China in it, taking into 
considerations its politics, ideology, needs or interests, and how are all 
factors mutually connected. Great attention is paid to principles of 
Chinese foreign policy and its goals. Even though some concepts do 
not reveal themselves in China’s behaviour or attitude explicitly, they 
still do shape them: the devil is often in the detail and may not be seen 
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at the first glance. I believe that the ideological background will help 
the kind reader to better understand the background on which China’s 
actions are formed. 
 
This thesis, however, does not aim to describe every move taken by 
the PRC in the field of UN peacekeeping. I concentrated on the events 
when either a significant change in the behaviour occurred or when 
the event reflected Chinese characteristics and tried to answer, or at 
least contemplate upon, some problems such as how does China 
benefit from participation or non-participation, what are the 
motivations and reasons or how international community perceives 
China in UN peacekeeping. 
 
I hope that this work could be of some use both to sinologists and 
people interested in international politics or security studies. 
 
1.2. On sources and translation 
This thesis draws of sources in English, Chinese and rarely Czech. 
The information about concrete operations or UN Charter was 
extracted from UN documents or press releases in English. The 
information about Chinese principles of foreign policy and ideology 
were taken analysed from PRC official documents or speeches or 
Chinese leadership. Secondary literature, mostly papers, articles and 
monographs, was used to support extracted information with other 
facts and to provide broader context needed for better comprehension 
of a problem.  
I encountered several problems while translating the Chinese primary 
sources: “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” 
(Guofang baipi shu: Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang de duoyanghua 
yunyong 国防白皮书：中国国防武装力量的多样化运用 and 
“White paper on China’s Peaceful Development” (“Zhongguo de 
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heping fazhan” baipi shu 《中国的和平发展》白皮书). There are 
both Chinese and English versions freely available on trustworthy 
websites and there was seemingly no reason for not analysing the 
English versions, which would have saved much effort.  
However, it is interesting that there are direct links in the English 
online version of The Diversified Employment of Chinese Forces to 
the following Appendixes: 
a) Appendix I: Joint Exercise and Training with Foreign Armed 
Forces 
b) Appendix II: Participation in International Disaster Relief and 
Recue 





The Chinese online version, however, mentions all above-listed 
Appendixes only as “Appendix I, Appendix II, Appendix III” (fujian 1, 
2, 3 附件 1、2、3) and at the end of the WDP 2013 dryly suggests 
the reader to “look for the [picture] content in the relevant document 
specially issued by Xinhua agency” (neirong qing jian Xinhua 
xinwenshe tupian zhuanxian suopei de xiangguan gaojian 内容请见
新华社新闻图片专线所配发的相关稿件) without providing the 
actual link or any hint. Whatever the reasons may be, I confess to 
having ultimately failed at finding “the relevant document”. 
 
Having this experience, I have decided to issue my own translations of 
Chinese materials. But there were other reasons too. The first was that 
the Chinese official and ideological materials are written in Chinese as 
first and any language mutation must be a translation which always 




 See http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2012.htm 
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differ from the original text, be it in terms of facts or modality.
2
 I dare 
to argue that modality or connotation of a word, phrase or sentence 
plays a great role, especially in the field of ideology. However, I have 
decided to use the official English version while translating names, 
chapters or core concepts for convenience of those who do not (yet) 
read Chinese. 
1.3. The problem of “China” 
I am very well aware of the “China” problem, i.e. who is the true 
representative of Chinese people and culture – whether the People’s 
Republic of China or the Republic of China. I do not take any stand on 
this issue here. But since this thesis deals with United Nations, and the 
representative of China to United Nations is PRC, the term “China” in 
this thesis refers to the People’s Republic of China. The Republic of 
China is referred to as “Republic of China” or “Taiwan”.  




 For information on translation theory see Popovič, Anton. 1983. Originál/preklad. 




2. What is peacekeeping 
2.1. Introduction 
The Cambridge Dictionaries Online (Cambridge University Press 
undated) defines peacekeeping as “the activity of preventing war and 
violence, especially using armed forces not involved in a disagreement 
to prevent fighting”. Another definition, somewhat more extensive, 
provides the Capstone Doctrine (United Nations 2008: 18) as follows: 
 
“Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, 
however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist 
in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. 
Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily 
military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of 
forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model 
of many elements – military, police and civilian – working 
together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”  
 
In this thesis, by the term “peacekeeping” I understand all kinds and 
forms of United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), 
including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and 
peacekeeping. I do realise that the ambiguity whether the word 
“peacekeeping” is used as a hyperonym or a hyponym may cause a 
certain deal of confusion. However, taking into account the above 
definitions and the concept of three generations of peacekeeping, as 
shall be introduced further, I believe that this dichotomy is justified. 
After all, an official United Nations (UN) document states that the 
boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred (Ibid.) and 
they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. (Ibid.: 20) Sometimes the 
term “United Nations peace operation” is used; yet it is often, 
inconsistently, deliberately, and mutually substituted with the phrase 
of “peacekeeping operations”. The reason might be that, as Doyle and 
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Sambias (2006: 11) point out, “peacekeeping per se is nowhere 
described in the [UN] Charter” and the arguably most complex 
description provides the Capstone Doctrine. Despite the fact that there 
is, in my opinion, a need for more accurate and narrow definitions of 
the terms used in the field of UNPKO, I have no capability, 
knowledge, or space in this bachelor thesis to resolve this issue and 
will therefore stick with the current custom. 
 
2.2. Legal and ideological background of UNPKO 
The Capstone Doctrine (United Nation 2008: 13) states, that “United 
Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated 
with Chapter VI of the Charter” but also stresses that the UNSC does 
not need to explain the connection of a UNPKO with human rights. 
However, Chapter VII is arguably of the same importance at least: 
“The Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter 
VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the 
State is unable to maintain security and public order.” (Ibid.: 14) 
Whereas the Chapter VI relates to pacific settlement of disputes, 
Chapter VII describes the range of actions with respect to threats to 
the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggressions, including 
deployment (United Nations 1945) 
 
Just like any other organization, UN must abide its Charter. There are 
quite a few articles in the Charter that may seem to forbid any state, or 
UN itself, to deploy an operation that would somehow interfere with 
the domestic affairs of a state, despite the state having become a failed 
state. This left UNPKO in a kind of a moral grey zone. But since UN 
was established to protect peace around the world and sometimes it 
seems that without an intervention a peace would never be reached, 




On 26 June 1998, just when the Kosovo crisis was extremely relevant, 
the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reflected on intervention:  
 
“Article 2.7 of the [UN] Charter protects national sovereignty 
even from intervention by the United Nations itself. (…) But let 
me remind you (…) that that Article forbids the United Nations 
to intervene „in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any State‟. (…) Violations of 
sovereignty remain violations of the global order. Yet in other 
contexts the word „intervention‟ has a more benign meaning. 
We all applaud the policeman who intervenes to stop a fight, 
or the teacher who prevents big boys from bullying a smaller 
one. (…) Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we 
can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or -- when 
neither of those things is possible -- at least to contain it and 
prevent it from spreading. (…) It is also what the Charter 
requires of us, particularly in Chapter VI, which deals with the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII, which 
describes the action the United Nations must take when peace 
comes under threat, or is actually broken.” (United Nations 
1999) 
 
By this speech he pushed UN interventions out of the moral grey zone, 
at least a little bit. 
 
2.3. The aim and forms of UNPKO 
The peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the 
implementation of a cease-fire or a more comprehensive peace 
agreement. (United Nations 2008: 16) Every deployment must have a 
consent of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which 
consists of five permanent members (United States, Russia, France, 
the United Kingdom, and China), and of ten non-permanent members 
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that are elected for two years by the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA). (United Nations Security Council undated)  In general, an 
authorization for an intervention (i.e. an action not limited solely to 
but including peacekeeping operations) requires the affirmative vote 
of nine states of the UNSC, including no negative votes from the five 
permanent members, and four positive votes from the elected 
members. (Doyle and Sambias 2006: 9) Then the UNSC issues a 
resolution, giving the operation a mandate which is binding for all UN 
participants. 
  
2.4. Generations of UNPKO 
As Doyle and Sambias (2006: 10) mention, the UN’s agenda for peace 
and security has rapidly expanded with the end of the Cold War. The 
UNSC summit held in January 1992 requested the then Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to prepare conceptual foundations of 
the UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, An Agenda for 
Peace (1992). In this report he defined types of peace operations as 
follows: 
 
 Preventive diplomacy [i. e. conflict prevention] is action to 
prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent 
existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the 
spread of the latter when they occur. (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 
under Article 20) Doyle and Sambias (2006: 10) clarify, that 
this includes confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early 
warning and possibly “preventive deployment” of UN 
authorised forces; preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the 












 Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, 
essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in 
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. (Boutros-
Ghali 1992: under Article 20) The Capstone Doctrine 
(2008: 17) adds that the United Nations Secretary General, 
upon the request of the Security Council or the General 
Assembly or at his or her own initiative, may exercise his or 
her “good offices” to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. 
Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of 
states, regional organizations or the United Nations. 
 
 Peace-keeping [or peacekeeping] is the deployment of a 
United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent 
of all the parties concerned
4
, normally involving United 
Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making 
of peace. (Boutros-Ghali 1992: under Article 20) 
 
There is no plain and straightforward definition of peace enforcement 
in the Agenda for Peace and its description needs to be extracted from 
various places in the document.
5
 A very nice summery present Doyle 
and Sambias (2006: 10): 
 




 Compare with the definition at the beginning of this thesis. Note that the Secretary 
General and the Capstone Doctrine (2008) definitions are slightly different. This 
again reflects the ambiguity of terms in the field of UN peacekeeping. Furthermore 
note the Capstone Doctrine mentioning that without a consent, a UNPKO risks 
becoming a party to the conflict and being drawn towards enforcement action (2008: 
32).  
5
 See the Articles 42, 43, 44, and 45 of Agenda for Peace (1992). 
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 Peace enforcement, authorised to act with or without the 
consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a 
cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under 
authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these military 
forces are composed of heavily armed national forces 
operating under the direction of Secretary General. 
 
Furthermore, Doyle and Sambias (2006: 11) present an idea of three 
generations of UN peacekeeping: 
 
a) first generation peacekeeping, which calls for the interposition 
of a force after a truce has been reached 
b) second generation operations that rely on the consent of the 
parties 
c) third generation operations that operate with [UN] Chapter VII 
mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting 
the parties’ acquiescence 
 
It is vital to note that peacekeeping troops are by no means to be 
mistaken for, or misinterpreted as, a primary combat force. Under the 
Security Council mandate, this task is traditionally assigned to 
peacemaking operations. The peacekeepers may, however, use force 
at the tactical level in self-defence or in defence of the mandate but 
the authorisation of the Security Council is required. (United Nations 
2008: 34) These peacekeeping operations are called “robust” 
peacekeeping operations and seem to resemble peace enforcement 
operations. This might be one of the reasons why there are still blur 
lines in the terminology of UNPKO.
6
 There are also multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operations that almost always include 




 See the chapter 2.1. 
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peacebuilding activities and make up the majority of the […] 
peacekeeping operations. (International Crisis Group 2009: 2) 
 
2.5. Peacebuilding 
The ultimate aim of any form of UNPKO is to end violence, provide 
both secure and stable environment favourable to sustainable peace 
and the rule of law with respect to human rights (Ibid.: 23). Another 
key factor is to prevent the conflict from re-emerging after the 
withdrawal of UN peacekeepers. Peacebuilding activities therefore 
play an essential part of most of successful UNPKO. Despite the wide 
diversity of individual missions, there are at least four prerequisites 
that need to be met should the aftermath’s peace be sustainable. These 
are: 
 
a) Restoring the state’s ability to provide security and maintain 
public order 
b) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights 
c) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions 
and participatory processes 
d) Promoting social and economical development, including the 
safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and 
refugees uprooted by the conflict (Ibid.: 25) 
 
The Capstone Doctrine (2008: 26) remarks that UNPKO generally 
lack the programme funding and technical expertise to 
comprehensively implement effective peacebuilding programmes, and 
that they are yet mandated to play a catalytic role in the following 
critical peacebuilding activities: 
 
a) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants 
b) Mine action (e. g. minesweeping) 
c) Protection of promotion of human rights 
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d) Electoral assistance 
e) Support to the restoration and extension of state authority 
 
Since there is limited space in this thesis and a picture is worth a 
thousand words, I take the liberty to present a chart from the Capstone 





As far as PRC’s engagement is concerned, the White Defense Paper 
2013 (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 
2013, under Guoji mienan jiuyuan he rendaozhuyi yuanzhu 国际灾难
援 助 和 人 道 主 义 援 助  [International Disaster Relief and 
Humanitarian Aid]) says:  
 
“Chinese armed forces actively participate in international 
governmental humanitarian aid and disaster relief actions; 
they [also] provide material and medical aid and send rescue 
teams to relevant disaster-stricken countries, provide 
minesweeping assistance and participate in international 
disaster relief cooperation.” (Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang jiji 
canjia zhengfu zuzhi de guoji zainan jiuyuan he rendaozhuyi 
yuanzhu, xiang youguan shouzaiguo tigong jiuyuan wuzi ye 
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yiliao jiuzhu, paichu zhuanye jiuyuandui fu shouzaiguo jiuzhu 
jianzai, wei youguan guojia tigong saolei yuanzhu, kaizhan 





PRC’s role in peacebuilding activities listed above differs to a great 
extent: sometimes there is comparatively less action for various 
reasons (for instance in the area of promoting human rights due to 
PRC’s rather ambiguous stand on human rights in general), sometimes 
there is a great deal of involvement. The principles, motivations, and 
historical development of China’s role in UNPKO shall be described 




3. Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence and the UN Charter 
Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence (heping gongchu wu xiang 
yuanze 和平共处五项原则) were first publicly mentioned by Zhou 
Enlai (周恩来) on 31 December 1953 during negotiations with India 
over disputed territories in Himalayas that took place in Beijing: 
 
“We believe that relations between China and India will get 
better every day. There are some unsolved problems that are to 
be solved and smoothly solved they definitely will be. After 
founding the New China, the principles of handling relations 
between China and India were laid down. These are mutual 
respect for state sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual 
non-interference in state‟s inner affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit and peaceful co-existence. (Women xiangxin, Zhong 
Yin liangguo de guanxi hui yitian yitian di haoqilai. Mou xie 
chengshu de, xuan‟erweijue de wenti yiding hui shunli di jiejue 
de. Xin Zhongguo chengli hou jiu quelile chuli Zhong Yin 
liangguo guanxi de yuanze, na jiu shi huxiang zunzhong lingtu 
wanzheng, hubu qinfan, hu bu ganshe neizheng, pingdeng 




不干涉内政、平等互惠和和平共处的原则。) (Zhou Enlai 
waijiao wenxuan 1990: 63) 
 
Later on, these principles were stated in the foreword of the 
Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic 
of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and 
India (Guanyu Zhongguo Xizang difang he Yindu zhi jian de 
tongshang he jiaotong xieyi 《关于中国西藏地方和印度之间的通商
23 
 
和交通协》 ) signed on 29 April 1954. The Sino-Soviet joint 
declaration from 12 October 1954 closer specified the first principle as 
“mutual respect for state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” 
(huxiang zunzhong zhuquan he lingtu wanzheng 互相尊重主权和领
土完整) and on 28 June 1954 the joint declaration of the Chinese and 
Indian government reformulated the Chinese wording of the principle 
of “equality and mutual benefit” to pingdeng huli 平等互利. (Wang 
and Wang 2000: 33) This has been the last change yet. The principles 
have been mentioned in countless treaties or speeches and have 
become one of the most stable and persistent parts of Chinese foreign 
policy. They were incorporated even into the PRC Charter (Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo xianfa 中华人民共和国宪法), Chinese White 
Defence Papers (Guofang baipi shu 国防白皮书), or the White Paper 
on China’s Peaceful Development. 
 
The Wangs present an idea that the Five Principles of Mutual Co-
existence “could become international basic principles, because they 
are consistent with the objectives and principles of the UN Charter” 
(youyu heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze yu lianheguo xianzhang 
zongzhi he yuanze yizhixing, cong‟er shi ta neng chengwei guojifa de 
jiben yuanze 由于和平共处五项原则与《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则
的一致性，从而使它能成为国际法的基本原则。 Ibid.). Some 
might argue that the Five Principles are merely stressing several key 
points of the UN Charter and the Wangs’ idea might seem a little 
controversial then. For instance, the UN Charter already states basic 
principles some of which are in nature similar to the Five Principles; 
to give a few examples, the principles of mutual respect for state’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and mutual non-interference in 
state’s inner affairs resemble to Article 2, Sections 1, 4 or 7 of the UN 





The Organization is based on the 
principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members. 
di yi kuan 第一款 
Ben zuzhixi jiyu ge huiyuanguo 




All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. 
di si kuan 第四款 
Ge huiyuanguo zai qi guoji 
guanxishang bu dei shiyong 
weixie huo wuli, huo yi lianheguo 
zongzhi bu fu zhi renhe qita 
fangfa, qinhai renhe huiyuanguo 
huo guojia zhi lingtu wanzheng 







Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter; but 
this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. 
di qi kuan 第七款 
Ben xianzhang bu dei renwei 
yuanquan lianheguo ganshe zai 
benzhishang shuyu renhe 
guojianai guanxia zhi shijian, 
bingqie bu yaoqiu huiyuanguo 
jiang gai xiang shijian yi ben 
Xianzhang tiqing jiejue;dan ci 
xiang yuanze bu fang‟ai di qi 










(UN Charter lianheguo xianzhang 1945, Chapter I di yi tiao 第一条) 
 
As demonstrated above, both the English and Chinese versions of both 
the Five Principles of Mutual Co-existence and the UN Charter have 
the same wording (territorial integrity – lingtu wanzheng 领土完整) 
or bear the same notion. I dare to say there is an obvious link between 
the principle of state sovereignty (zhuquan 主权), equality and mutual 
benefit (pingdeng huli 平等互利 ), or mutual non-interference in 
state’s inner affairs (hu bu ganshe neizheng 互不干涉内政) and the 
concepts of political independence (zhengzhi duli 政治独立 ) or 
interventions in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state (ganshe zai benzhishang shuyu renhe 
guojianai guanxia zhi shijian 干涉在本质上属于任何国家国内管辖
之事件). However brief and shallow this lexical analysis of the UN 
Charter and the Five Principles of Mutual Co-existence may be, it 
seems clear that the Five Principles are based on, or at least inspired 
by, the UN Charter, and that only, seemingly, minor adjustments were 
made. So why China did not accept the UN Charter at all as one of the 
pillars of its foreign policy in 1950s? There are two possible, closely 
connected answers. 
 
First, the PRC was not a member of the UN until 25 October 1971 
when the 1976
th
 plenary meeting of the UNGA “restored the lawful 
rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations” and 
the Republic of China consequently had to pass its seat to Beijing. 
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(United Nations 1971) Striving for membership but still being a non-
member, Beijing could hardly accept a document issued by an 
organisation that did not recognize the PRC as a sovereign state yet its 
leadership needed foreign policy principles they could adhere to.  
 
Second, the then-Beijing could not accept the UN Charter because it 
did not fit its security and ideological interests. The Maoist PRC 
strongly opposed any kind of “imperialism” and denounced the whole 
UN project as “an instrument for the US and USSR to expand their 
respective spheres of influence.” (International Crisis Group 2009: 3) 
Moreover, the PRC-hostile Republic of China had a powerful ally – 
the United States that wielded major influence in the UN. Beijing 
might have been concerned about possible implementation of the 
Chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter that allows the UN to take 
military action. Nevertheless, after the UNGA issued the Resolution 
2758 and Beijing took Taipei’s seat, the PRC accepted the UN Charter. 
Having had the Five Principles as an official foreign policy gave 
China’s policymakers a halo of ideological continuity with minor 




4. China’s Peaceful Development 
4.1. Introduction 
Along with the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence, the China’s 
Peaceful Development policy is one of the key guidelines in PRC’s 
foreign policy and, just like the Five Principles, this policy is being 
mentioned not only in many works dealing with contemporary China 




“The White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development” was issued on 
6 September 2011 by the Information Office of the State Council
8
 
(Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 国务院新闻办公室) and both the 
Chinese and English versions were published on its websites. The 
Chinese version is also to be found on People’s Daily
9
 websites. All 
versions are still accessible to date of submitting this thesis and there 
has been no evidence any of the versions change. 
 
To better understand the structure and context of the document, I list 
its six parts: 
 
a) Foreword (mulu 目录) 
b) The Path of China’s Peaceful Development: What It Is About 
(Zhongguo heping fazhan daolu de kaipi 中国和平发展道路
的开辟)10 




 For example see Chinese White Defense Paper 2013 or Chinese White Defense 
Paper 2015. 
8
 The State Council is the executive state body. It is responsible also for creating the 




 In my opinion and with respect to the context, a more adequate translation would 
be “The Background of of China’s Peaceful Development Path”. The official 
translation is nevertheless not entirely wrong since it retains the original heading’s 
function and is not really misleading. 
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c) What China Aims to Achieve by Pursuing Peaceful 
Development (Zhongguo heping fazhan de zongti mubiao 中国
和平发展的总体目标)11 
d) China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing Peaceful Development 
(Zhongguo heping fazhan de duiwai fangzhen zhengce 中国和
平发展的对外方针政策) 
e) China’s Path of Peaceful Development is a Choice 
Necessitated by History (Zhonggguo heping fazhan shi lishi de 
biran xuanze 中国和平发展是历史的必然选择) 
f) What China’s Peaceful Development Means to the World 
(Zhongguo heping fazhan de shijie yiyi 中国和平发展的世界
意义) 
 
The chapter names more or less describe the structure and content of 
the document. The relevant parts shall be dealt with as follows. 
 
4.2. Core principles of China’s Peaceful Development policy 
The China’s Peaceful Development White Paper describes “the way 
of peaceful development” as follows: 
 
“From a broader perspective of world history, the way of 
peaceful development is basically both developing oneself by 
protecting world peace and protecting world peace by self-
development; [it is] emphasizing self-reliance and reform 
innovations and [thus] develop; keep open door and learn 
from other countries; [it is] seeking mutual development, 
mutual benefit and win-win situations in compliance with 




 This being a similar case to the previous one: “General Aims of China’s Peaceful 
Development”. The omission of the word of zongti 总体  (overall) might be, 
however, slightly misleading. 
29 
 
economic globalisation development trends; [it is] advocating 
for harmonious world of durable peace, common prosperity in 
cooperation with the world community. This way is primarily 
characterised by scientific development, independent 
development, open development, peaceful development, 
cooperative development, and common development.” (Cong 
geng kuanguang de shijei lishi shiye kan, heping fazhan daolu 
guijie qilai jiu shi: ji tongguo weihu shijie heping fazhan ziji, 
you tongguo zishen fazhan weihu shijie heping; zai qiangdiao 
yikao zishen liliang he gaige chuangxin shixian fazhan de 
tongshi, jianchi dui wai kaifang, xuexi jiejian bieguo changchu; 
shunying jingji quanqiuhua fazhan chaoliu, xunqiu yu ge guo 
huli gongying he gongtong fazhan; tong guoji shehui yidao 
nuli, tuidong jianshe chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie 
shijie. Zhe tiao daolu zui xianming de tezheng shi kexue fazhan, 








发展、和平发展、合作发展、共同发展。 ) (Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2011, 
under Zhongguo heping fazhan daolu de kapi) 
 
China’s Peaceful Development policy unsurprisingly builds both on 
old and contemporary guidelines, for instance Hu Jintao’s Scientific 
Outlook on Development (kexue fazhan guan 科学发展观), Deng 
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Xiaoping’s economic reforms (kaifang gaige 开放改革) as we can see 
above, or on time-proven policies, such as Five Principles of Mutual 
Coexistence: “China has been developing its friendly cooperation with 
all countries on the core principle basis strictly adhering to Five 
Principles of Mutual Coexistence” (Zhongguo jianchi zai heping 
gongchu wu xiang jiben yuanze de jichu shang tong suoyou guojia 
fazhan youhao hezuo. 中国坚持在和平共处五项基本原则的基础上
同所有国家发展友好合作。) (Ibid.: under Chuangzao heping guoji 
huanjing he youli waibu tiaojian 创造和平国际环境和有利外部条件 
[Creating a peaceful international environment and favorable external 
conditions]) 
 
4.3. China’s reasons and motivations for the Peaceful 
Development policy 
Many of real reasons and motivations for PRC to pursue the Peaceful 
Development policy are put down in the White Paper itself. The paper 
points out that “the Chinese are numerous with limited resources. 
Almost 20 % of the world population is supported by 7.9 % of world 
arable land and 6.5 % of world potable water. The achievements of 
socioeconomic development are shared by 1.3 billion people.” 
(Zhongguo renkou duo, dizi bo, yong shijie 7.9 % de gengdi he 6.5 % 
de danshui ziyuan huozhe shijie jin 20 % de renkou, jingji shehui 
fazhan chengjiu yao you 13 yi duo ren gongxiang […] 中国人口多、
底子薄，用世界 7.9 % 的耕地和 6.5 % 的淡水资源养活着世界近
20 % 的人口，经济社会发展成就要由 13 亿多人共享 […]) 
(Ibid.: under Heping fazhan shi Zhongguo jiben guoqing de yaoqiu 和
平发展是中国基本国情的要求 [Peaceful development is determined 
by China’s basic national conditions.]) Moreover, China’s lack of 
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resources is not limited solely to arable land or potable water. China is 
one of world’s biggest importers of raw materials
12
 due to its 
economic and industrial growth which has been relying on export. 
Therefore, “[China] has needed peaceful, stable international 
environment and massive cooperation with foreign countries.” 




Having the situation outlined, the White Paper further states that “the 
overall aim of Chinese peaceful development is to modernise the state 
and ensure common material wellbeing of the [Chinese] people.” 
(Shixian guojia xiandaihua he renmin gongtong fuyu shi Zhongguo 
heping fazhan de zongti mubiao. 实现国家现代化和人民共同富裕是
中国和平发展的总体目标。) (Ibid.) This statement is followed by a 
Chinese point of view on the development history and outline, that 
follows and refers to Deng Xiaoping’s reforms:  
 
“After the Deng Xiaoping‟s economic reform it the late 70‟s in 
the 20
th
 century, China adopted and implemented a „three-step‟ 
strategy of modernisation development. The first step was to 
double the 1980-China GNP and to ensure people‟s basic 
living needs. The second step was to double [China‟s] GNP 
again by the end of 20
th
 century and to raise people‟s livings to 
the medium prosperous level. These two steps have already 
been taken. The third step is to make the per capita GNP reach 
the level of a medium-developed country, make sure that 
people‟s well-being is quite good, basically finish 




 According to the data of World Trade Organization (undated), China’s share in 
world imports of fuels and mining products reached 27.9 % in 2013. 
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modernisation and build a rich, strong, democratic, civilised, 
and harmonious modern socialist state by the half of this 
century by the centenary of the People‟s Republic of China. 
The ultimate aim of the „three steps‟ strategy is to raise 
people‟s both material and cultural living standards, and to 
realize unity of the rich [Chinese] and the strong [Chinese] 
state. At the same time, with increasing comprehensive power 
China shall appropriately perform its international role. (20 
shiji 70 niandai mo shixing gaige kaifang hou, Zhongguo 
zhiding bing shishi le “san bu zou” de xiandaihua fazhan 
zhanlüe. Di yi bu, shixian guomin shengchan zongzhi bi 1980 
nian fan yi fan, jiejue renmin wenbao wenti. Di er bu, dao 20 
shiji mo shixian guomin shengchan zongzhi zai fan yi fan, 
renmin shenghuo dadao xiaokang shuiping. Zhe liang bu 
mubiao yijing shixian. Di san bu, dao ben shiji zhongye 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli 100 nian shi, renjun 
guomin shengchan zongzhi dadao zhongdeng fada huojia 
shuiping, renmin shenghuo bijiao fuyu, jiben shixian 
xiandaihua, jiancheng fuqiang minzhu wenming hexie de 
shehuizhuyi xiadaihua guojia. “San bu zou” mubiao de hexin 
renwu shi, tigao renmin wuzi wenhua shenghuo shuiping, 
shixian fumin yu qiangguo de tongyi. Tongshi, yao suizhe 
zonghe guoli de buduan zengqiang, lüxing xiangying de guoji 












强，履行相应的国际责任的义务。) (Ibid.: under Zhongguo 
heping fazhan de zongti mubiao 中国和平发展的总体目标 
[What China Aims to Achieve by Pursuing Peaceful 
Developement]) 
 
In conclusion, the Chinese government says it has been trying to 
strengthen the country and to enormously improve common living 
standards (quadrupling the country’s GNP within twenty years); the 
White Paper adds that China’s wellbeing and development is 
dependent on world peace. Assuming that foreign trade is highly 
limited during war times and looking on the World Trade 
Organization statistics indicating that China has been an export-
oriented country yet still importing large quantity of goods (World 
Trade Organization undated) at the same time, China’s economic 
growth really might slow down if a larger share of its trade partners 
were engaged in a war conflict. 
 
Additionally, the stable and peaceful international environment is not 
only an interest of the People’s Republic of China merchants. The 
ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) has been justifying its 
autocratic rule, connected with human right abuses and poor 
democratic standards, by economic growth and general improvement 
of citizens’ living standards. Therefore, already experiencing ethnic 
tensions, in a case of hypothetical economic rapid slowdown China 
might see a large wave of socioeconomic tensions which could result 
in challenging CPC’s authority. The increase of per capita GNP, 
finishing modernisation and building a rich, strong, and socialist state 




4.4. China’s means to pursue the Peaceful Development policy  
The White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development dedicates a rather 
large space to the ways China shall follow in order to pursue and 
achieve peaceful development. However, there is little space to 
inquire into all ways mentioned; moreover few of them are relevant to 
the topic of this thesis.
13
 I shall therefore deal only with the relevant 
ones. 
 
Referring to the previous part, it is logical that China wants to “fully 
take advantage of any favourable circumstances resulting from 
economic globalisation and local economic cooperation.” (chongfen 
liyong jingji quanqiuhua he quyu jingji hezuo tigong de ge zhong youli 
tiaojian 充分利用经济全球化和区域经济合作提供的各种有利条
件). (Ibid.: under Shishi huli gongying de kaifang zhanlüe 实施互利
共赢的开放战略 [Implementing the opening-up strategy of mutual 
benefit]) Along with its growing monetary, power, and influence 
potential, China has started active foreign cooperation actions: 
 
[China shall] put a greater emphasis on [its] foreign 
investments. [China will] encourage all types of companies in 
organised foreign investment and cooperation, support 
investments in research and development abroad, start foreign 
contract projects and labour force cooperation, strengthen 
international cooperation in agriculture, [and] deepen 
mutually beneficial international cooperation in the 
development of energy or other resources. [China will] make a 




 To name some: accelerating the shift of the growth model (jiakuai zhuanbian 
jingji fazhan fangshi 加快转变经济发展方式), further exploiting own [Chinese] 
resouce and market strengths (jin yi bu wajue zishen ziyuan he shichang youshi 进一
步挖掘自身资源和市场优势), or accelerating the construction of harmonious 
society (jiakuai goujian hexie shehui 加快构建和谐社会) (Ibid.) 
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great effort to develop projects aiming to improve the lives of 
host country people and to strengthen the host country‟s ability 
of independent development […]. (Geng jia zhongshi dui wai 
touzi hezuo. Guli ge lei qiye youxu kaizhan jingwai touzi hezuo 
jingying, zhichi zai jingwai kaizhan jishu yanfa touzi hezuo, 
kaizhan haiwai gongcheng chengbao he laodong hezuo, kuoda 
nongye lingyu guoji hezuo, shenhua guoji nengyuan ziyuan 
kaifa huli hezuo. Dali kaizhan youli yu gaishan dongdaoguo 
renmin he zengqiang dongdaoguo zizhu fazhan nengli de 





目合作[…]。) (Ibid.: under Shishi huli gongying de kaifang 
zhanlüe 实施互利 共 赢的开 放战 略 [Implementing the 
opening-up strategy of mutual benefit]) 
 
Given some China’s investments in developing and risky regions and 
its needs to protect its foreign energy supply sources, as suggested in 
the following chapters, UNPKO present a invaluable means of 
protection. The effort “to develop projects aiming to improve the lives 
of host country people and to strengthen the host country’s ability of 
independent development” present a public-friendly reason for active 






5. Chinese White Defence Paper 2013 
5.1. Introduction 
The paper “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” 
(WDP 2013) was issued on 16 May 2013 by Information Office of the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013) It was published, 
and to date of submitting this thesis still is available, on both the 
Chinese and English version of the official website of the Chinese 
Ministry of Defense. Xiong and Wang (2013) state that “this [WDP 
2013] is the eighth White Defense Paper the Chinese government 
issued since 1998. […] The White Defence Paper has about fifteen 
thousand [Chinese] characters altogether, [and] it was published in 
Chinese, English, French, Russian, German, Spanish, Arabic, and 
Japanese. […] The Chinese and English single-volume editions were 
already printed by People’s Publishing House and Foreign Languages 
Press. Starting from today [16 April 2013], [the single-volume 
editions] are distributed in Xinhua bookstores all over the country.” 
(Zhe shi zi 1992 nian yi lai Zhongguo zhengfu fabiao de di ba bu 
guofang baipishu. […] Baipishu quanwen yue 1 wan 5 qian zi, yi 
zhong, ying, fa, e, de, xi, a, ri 8 zhong wenzi fabiao. […] Baipishu 
zhong, ying ban danxingben yi fenbie you Renmin chubanshe, Waijiao 
chubanshe chuban, jiri qi zai quanguo Xinhua shudian faxing. 这是自
1992 年以来中国政府发表的第八部国防白皮书。[…] 白皮书全文
约 1 万 5 千字，以中、英、法、俄、德、西、阿、日 8 种文字发
表。[…] 白皮书中、英版单行本已分别由人民出版社、外文出版
社出版，即日起在全国新华书店发行) 14  
 




 It remains unclear, though, where and how the non-Chinese and non-English have 
been published and whether they were published in print. I believe that if they were, 
it was not large-scale publishing. 
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The WDP 2013 is, by some of Chinese state media, said to be a 
groundbreaking document: “The White Defense Paper has for the first 
time made public the overall number of soldiers in the land force, air 
force, and the navy, the number of soldiers in eighteen land groups, 
and [mentions] the important [weapon] models used by the Second 
Artillery Force.” (Baipishu shouci gongbu lu hai kong san jun yuan‟e, 
lujun 18 jituanjun de fanhao ji erpao de zhongyao wuqi xinghao. 白皮
书首次公布陆海空三军员额、陆军 18 个集团军的番号及二炮的
主要武器型号。) (Xiong and Wang 2013) Nevertheless, concrete 
figures concerning UNPKO can  be traced back to WDP 2002. WDP 
2000 (which is to-date of this thesis submission the oldest WDP 
available on Chinese Ministry of Defence’s websites) also presents 
some figures, however the information are not too thorough. 
 
Since the sections of WDP 2013 are also key development areas of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which, as shall be shown further, are 
closely connected with determining China’s role in UNPKO, I list 
them as follows: 
 
a) Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces 
(wuzhuang liliang jianshe yu fazhan 武装力量建设与发展) 
b) Defending National Sovereignty, Security and Territorial 
Integrity (hanwei guojia zhuquan, anquan, lingtu wanzheng 捍
卫国家主权、安全、领土完整) 
c) Supporting National Economic and Social Development 
(baozhang guojia jingji shehui fazhan 保障国家机关内及社
会发展) 
d) Safeguarding World Peace and Regional Stability (weihu shijie 




There are naturally also Preface (qianyan 前言 ) and Concluding 
Remarks (jieshuyu 结束语) but since these hardly are priorities of 
PLA development, I do not mention them in the list above. The same 
goes for the chapter “New Situation, New Challenges and New 
Missions” (xin xingshi, xin tiaozhan, xin shiming 新形势、新挑战、
新使命) which introduces Chinese official grounds and point of view 
on the world security situation. 
 
5.2. Priorities and aims of PLA development as described in 
WDP 2013 
WDP 2013 lists and describes the priorities and aims of PLA 
development, and summarises one of the key ideas as follows: 
 
[The PLA seeks] to improve the system of a new-type military 
training, to deepen the adjustment reform policies of military 
human resources and logistics, intensify development of hi-
tech weaponry and equipment, and to build a modern military 
system with Chinese characteristics .(Wanshang xinxing jundui 
rencai peiyang tixi, shenhua junshi renli ziyuan he houqin 
zhengce zhidu gaige, jiaqiang gaoxin jishu wuzhuang 
zhuangbei jianshe, nuli goujian Zhongguo tese xiandai junshi 
liliang tixi. 完善新型军队人才培养体系，深化军事人力资
源和后勤政策制度调整改革，加强高新技术武器装备建设，
努力构建中国特色现代军事力量体系。) (Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013: under 
Wuzhuang liliang jianshe yu fazhan 武装力量建设与发展 
[Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces]) 
 
I would like to point out that the idea of “building a modern military 
system with Chinese characteristics” is a no new idea or concept. As 
Blasko (2006: 5) says, “the Chinese military has been in the process of 
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modernisation and transformation for more than twenty-five years.” A 
large scale modernisation was initiated in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping’s 
Four Modernisations (si ge xiandaihua 四个现代化) that were to be 
carried out in the fields of agriculture, industry, science and 
technology, and defence (i.e. military). (Fairbank 2010: 450) The first 
step in PLA modernisation was to reduce the number of troops: the 
initial four million were reduced to roughly 3.5 million in mid-1980s 
and went on reducing. (Worthing 2007: 187) China also opened up to 
the world and welcomed foreign connections (Fairbank 2010: 449) I 
believe that China having started contributing into the UNPKO fund 
relatively shortly after launching Four Modernisations, as shall be 
discussed further, is a result of the changes in the then-PRC. 
 
The WDP 2013 outlines some of the areas where modernisation is 
allegedly needed. They are mentioned as one of the principles of 
“diversified employment of Chinese armed forces”: 
 
“Win local wars under informationization conditions; expand 
and deepen the military preparedness. […] Intensify joint 
employment of various branches of armed forces and increase 
the ability of systematically waging war based on information 
systems. Innovate and develop people‟s war strategy skills, 
[…], improve the quality of national defense mobilisation and 
reserve force building. […]” (Lizu daying xinxihua tiaojian xia 
jubu zhanzheng, tuozhan he shenhua junshi douzheng zhunbei. 
[…] Jiaqiang jun bingzhong liliang lianhe yunyong, tigao jiyu 
xinxi xitong de tixi zuozhan nengli. Chuangxin fazhan renmin 
zhanzheng zhanlüe zhanshu, […], tigao guofang dongyuan he 






量。 ) (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen 
bangongshi 2013: under xin xingshi, xin tiaozhan, xin shiming 
新形势、新挑战、新使命 [New Situation, New Challenges 
and New Missions]) 
 
A great emphasis is also put on the army’s involvement in the society. 
As already suggested, the PLA should support national economic and 
social development, which is actually incorporating the China’s 
Peaceful Development policy into military doctrines such as WDP 
2013, putting it next to tasks military in nature. After all, it is clearly 
stated that  
 
“the diversified employment of Chinese armed forces sticks to 
the following basic principles [e. g. PLA sticks to the following 
principles]: To protect state sovereignty, safety, and territorial 
integrity and to safeguard China‟s peaceful development.” 
(Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang de duoyanghua yuunyong, jianchi 
yi xia jiben zhengce he yuanze: Weihu guojia zhuquan, anquan, 




Additionally, PLA is supposed to carry out various tasks of non-war 
character (suixing fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong renwu 遂行非战争
军事行动任务), such as emergency rescue and disaster relief (qiang 
xian jiu zai 抢险救灾), emergency response and rescue works (yingji 
jiuzhu 应急救援 ), protection of [Chinese] sea vessels (haishang 
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baohu 海上保航), or evacuation15 of Chinese citizens overseas (cheli 
haiwai gongmin 撤离海外公民) (Ibid.) and on protection of overseas 
interests (weihu haiwai liyi 维护好外利益 ) – energy resources 
(haiwai nengyuan ziyuan 海外能源资源), legal persons (haiwai faren 
海外法人), strategic sea routs (haishang zhanlüe tongdao 海上战略
通道), etc. – in general. (Ibid.) 
 
A great emphasis is placed on international cooperation as well. This 
phenomenon is omnipresent in WDP 2013. Presumably most 
important principles in the doctrine may be deepening international 
security cooperation (shenhua guoji hezuo 深化国家安全合作 ), 
keeping comprehensive military affairs contacts with foreign countries 
(quan fangwei kaizhan duiwai junshi jiaowang 全方位开展对外军事
交往), developing cooperative military relations that are not aligned, 
non-confrontational and not directed against any other third party
16
 
(fazhan bu jiemeng, bu duikang, bu zhendui di san fang de junshi 
hezuo guanxi 发展不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方的军事合作关
系), participating in international anti-terrorist programs (canjia […] 
guoji fankong hezuo 参加[…]国际反恐合作), in ship protection and 
disaster relief programs (guoji huhang he jiuzai xingdong 国际护航和
救灾行动), conduct joint [military] exercises with foreign [armies] 
(juxing Zhong wai lianyan lianxun 举行中外联演联训), and last but 
definitely not least participating in UNPKO (canjia lianheguo weihe 
xingdong 参加联合国维和行动). (Ibid.) 
  




 With reference to the subchapter of WDP 2013 “Protecting Overseas Interests” 
(Weihu haiwai liyi 维护海外利益), the evacuation of overseas citizens is perceived 
as their protection. 
16
 This translation is taken from the English version of WDP 2013 because the 
translator’s solution is the best possible. 
42 
 
6. China’s motivations and reasons behind participating in and 
supporting UNPKO 
6.1. Acquainting with state of the art and personnel benefits 
UNPKO are multinational in nature and, seeing the statistics of the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, hardly having personnel of a 
single country. I believe it is safe to assume that the personnel need to 
communicate not only within their country’s group but also with other 
mission-participating countries. This is one of the ways for China to 
“keep comprehensive military affairs contacts with foreign countries”. 
 
Furthermore, China declares that it will “strengthen strategic guidance 
to keep up with the times” (yu shi ju jin jiaqiang junshi zhanlüe 
zhidao 与时俱进加强战略指导 ). (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013, under Qianyan 前言 [Preface]) 
Whatever “strengthening strategic guidance” really mean, the sentence 
implies that besides keeping with the times, China wants to keep up 
with the military state of the art; and it is necessary to know what the 
current state of the art is in order to keep up with it. Through the 
international cooperation (which the WDP 2013 also suggests to be 
desirable) “on peacekeeping duty Chinese officers can gain exposure 
to the operational practices and methods of foreign military forces.” 
(Lague undated) 
 
UNPKO are great opportunities to get a first-hand, or at least second-
hand, experience of modern technologies, military tactics, ways of 
command, rescue work or any other procedure China is interested in. 
As the International Crisis Group report (2009: 14) puts it: “China’s 
participation in peacekeeping gives its armed forces the opportunity to 
gain some of the technical skills and knowledge necessary for force 
modernisation, which has been a focus for China’s armed forces in 
recent years.” Participating in UNPKO is not limited to gaining skills, 
43 
 
though. Chinese personnel can also improve their current skills. 
Comprehensive training and field practices (or real missions) can 
improve the skills and professionalism of personnel (Thompson 2005) 
which is one of PLA aims as set up in the WDP 2013. He (2007: 55) 
adds that “many police officers with peacekeeping experience have 
been dispatched to overseas Chinese embassies as well as 
international institutions […] to work as police liaison officers.” This 
proves that PRC leadership is very well aware of benefits that result 
from participating on a UNPKO and does not hesitate to make a use of 
it. It is fair to assume that peacekeeping experience is beneficial for all 
kinds of personnel, such as rescue workers, doctors, etc., too. Another 
benefit according to He (Ibid.) is that “China’s participation also helps 
to improve its crisis management response effectiveness, especially in 
humanitarian operations.” 
 
Besides, UNPKO are not only an opportunity to get familiar with 
other countries’ military current state or trends but also a way of 
testing and enhancing personnel skill acquired in one’s own country. 
In short, peacekeeping deployments have provided practical 
experience for both military and police personnel. (International Crisis 
Group 2009: 15) 
 
He (2007: 48) believes that “there are three core reasons for China’s 
ongoing policy on UNPKO: being a responsible power, strengthening 
the UN and sharing common concerns for peace and security.” 
Another point of view presents the work Beyond the Strait 
(Kamphausen, Roy, Lai, David, and Scobell, Andrew, eds. 2009: 15). 
Its authors believe that China uses UNPKO “to balance what it sees as 





6.2. Raising international influence, disproving the China 
threat theory, protecting own interests 
I also believe that all China’s UNPKO involvements mentioned are 
essential to meet its proclaimed development and ideological goals.  
 
The UN is a multilateral institution. According to the International 
Crisis Group (2009: 13), “China sees involvement in multilateral 
institutions as a non-threatening way of promoting its national 
interests abroad. […] Moreover, increased involvement in 
peacekeeping provides an opportunity for China to place more 
personnel in the UN, boosting its presence in and influence over the 
organisation and its activities.” 
 
Lastly, China could use its participating and supporting UNPKO as a 
supportive counterarguments towards those who, reflecting upon 
PRC’s actions in the South China Sea or at the Pinnacle Islands, 
would like to argue with PRC government proclaiming that “Chinese 
love peace” (Zhonghua minzu shi aihao heping de minzu 中华民族是
爱好和平的民族) (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen 
bangongshi 2011, under Zhongguo heping fazhan daolu de kaipi 中国
和平发展道路的开辟 [The Path of China’s Peaceful Development: 
What It Is About]) since participating in a peacekeeping operation 
may suggest a country’s “love for peace”. Nevertheless, it would 
comply with International Crisis Group’s claim that “China is 
committed to […] showing that its increasing military power is not 
inherently threatening. (2009: 13) 
 
The wish for being seen as not an inherently threatening power is 
closely connected with the China threat theory (Zhongguo weixie lun 
中国威胁论), that reflects concerns stemming from China’s economic 
success (He 2007: 49) and China’s wish to be perceived as a 
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responsible power (fuzeren guojia 负责人国家) or even responsible 
great power (fuzeren daguo 负责任大国 ). (International Crisis 
Group: 12) These concepts are closely connected. After all, as He 
(2007: 49) draws on Thompson (2005), “wearing a blue helmet and 
actively participating in high profile UN peacekeeping activities 
furthers China’s image as a status quo nation that seeks to contribute 
to international stability through diplomatic and security measures, 
thus portraying a good image in eyes of the international community 
and serving to dispel the China threat theory.” 
 
On the other hand, He (2007: 62) is also clearly convinced that China 
threat theory as an obstacle to PRC participation in UNPKOs: 
 
“The China Threat theory has a negative impact on Beijing‟s 
policy on UNPKO and presents the Chinese leaders with a 
dilemma. Although China is willing to further shoulder the 
responsibilities of a big power for international peace and 
security, it also wishes to avoid being regarded as too 
“assertive.” In other words, although China has become 
increasingly willing to “be selectively active” in the 
international arena and do something worthwhile, in the 
foreseeable future, it will not abandon the fundamental 
principles of „keeping a low profile‟ and „never taking the lead‟ 
(jue bu chu tou 绝不出头).” 
 
I dare to present an opinion that the two “fundamental principles” are 
dead by now, though. China, having initiated Shanghai Cooperation 
Group or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, is no longer following 
them. 
 




“It must be emphasized that without the request of the EU and 
acquiescence of the U.S., no matter how hard both UN and the 
Lebanese government appealed to the Chinese government, 
and no matter how many interests it has in the Middle East, 




The International Crisis Group (2009: 28) on the topic of China threat 
theory concludes that “China is wary of being perceived as too 
assertive by the West or other developing countries, and overstepping 
the line between appearing responsible and threatening.” 
 
With reference to the China’s Peaceful Development, the regional 
stability is in China’s interest. “Instability abroad may not only affect 
the export of Chinese goods to the conflicting countries and 
neighbouring regions which suffer from the spillover effects of 
conflicts, it also affects Chinese access to raw materials in some 
places.” (He 2007: 53) To sum up, “instability in energy-producing 
parts of Africa and the Middle East is clearly not in Chinese 
interest.”
18
 (Green 2006) Especially in the Middle East since about 60 % 
of China’s oil imports come from this region. (Ong 2007: 17) 
 
In accordance with the goals and principles of the WDP 2013, 
UNPKO might also serve as protecting China’s citizens and interests 
by helping to improve the security situation in relevant countries and 




 I am not competent to decide whether this statement is completely accurate yet 
please see below the percentage of Chinese oil imports that origin in the Middle East 
and note that the author of the claim, He Yin, is Associate Professor at the China 
Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center. 
18
 Please note that the first UNPKO where Chinese deployed was Lebanon (see 
above), i.e. Middle East. Despite Lebanon not having the richest oil reserves in the 
area, the spillover effect might have caused the conflict spread into other regions and 
thus harming China’s energy security interests. 
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regions. (He 2007: 54) This may be becoming increasingly urgent, 
since “Chinese companies, citizens and compatriots have been 
repeatedly harassed, attacked or kidnapped by terrorists and criminals 
in foreign countries.” (Ibid.: 53) 
 
6.3. Having become stronger and favourable international 
environment 
PRC does not participate in UNPKOs and supports them just because 
it might help to meet its goals. A key reason behind is that the PRC 
can afford the participation and support now, both in terms of 
monetary and personnel issues. 
 
China is one of the largest economies in the world. He (2007: 44) says 
that since 1979 “China enjoyed a generally stable social and political 
environment.” Despite the recent corruption scandals or ongoing 
society tension, China really (has) enjoyed a generally stable social 
and political environment, at least compared to other parts of the 
world: such as Egypt, Syria, Libya, etc. “All these [the stable 
environment and being one of the world’s largest economies] 
contribute to the enhancement of national strength and provide China 
with more resources to increase participation in international affairs, 
including UNPKO.” (Ibid.) 
 
Another important feature may be the increased capability of Chinese 
personnel. China invested US $20 million in setting up a civilian 
police peacekeeping training center in 2003. (Ibid.) After more than 
two decades, China has accumulated sufficient experience in UNPKO 
as well as more knowledge about the UN system, which enhances its 
enthusiasm for UNPKO. (Ibid.: 47) PLA has been conducting joint 
military exercises with foreign armies. (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013, under Zhong wai jundui lianyan 
lianxun 中外军队联演联训  [Joint Exercises and Training with 
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Foreign Armed Forces]) For instance, “China and Britain have had 
much interactions ranging from training assistance to joint seminars, 
while France is also willing to reach consensus with China regarding 
long-term cooperation on peacekeeping training.” (He 2007: 46) The 
PRC thus needs to be less worried about losing the face
19
, than, for 
instance, two decades ago. 
 
It is vital to reiterate that UNPKO are multinational operations in 
nature. China could not participate in UN peacekeeping if other major 
countries had grave objections against it. US does not oppose Chinese 
attempts to strengthen its role in the international system at the 
moment (He 2007: 46) – what is more, all US presidents after Nixon 
think that the more is China engaged with the international community 
the better (Saich 2004: 306) and some prominent US scholars call for 
more cooperation in UNPKO (Shambaugh 2002: 338); Britain and 
France are also keen on China’s participation in international 
operations. For example, in 2004 the then British Defense Secretary 
Geoff Hoon said that it would be very welcome if China played a 
larger role in UNPKO. (He 2007: 46) 
 
  




 For non-sinologists’ convenience: In Chinese culture, losing the face (diu mianzi 
丢面子) is one of the worst things that can happen to a person, family, company or 
even a whole country. 
49 
 
7. The History of China’s Role in UNPKO 
 
7.1. Antagonistic attitude: pre-1971 
Except from those described in the Chapter of Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, there were other reasons for China to oppose 
and denounce the UN and peacekeeping operations. 
 
One of them was a possible concern about its own security and 
territorial integrity. After the outbreak of the Korean War the PLA 
clashed with UN troops. On the top of that, China was branded by the 
UNGA as an aggressor. (International Crisis Group 2009: 3) This, the 
US strong support for Taiwan, and other circumstances had affected 
China’s attitude toward UN for several years. As He (2007: 17) points 
out, “the vivid memory […] of Korean War […] and the fact that the 
superpowers and other western powers supported India during the 
1962 China-India Border War […] reinforced its [China’s] 
impressions that UNPKO could be used by the superpowers to 
damage China’s state sovereignty and interfere in its domestic affairs, 
such as the Taiwan Question.” 
 
Besides, the PRC kept on heating up the rhetoric as reads the report of 
the International Crisis Group (2009: 3): 
 
“Condemnation of UN activities peaked in 1965: in addition to 
several statements disparaging the organisation that year, a 
government publication termed the General Assembly‟s 
establishment of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping 
Operations a plot by the U.S. to „convert the United Nations 
into a US-controlled headquarters of international gendarmes 





A change in the antagonistic attitude did not come before PRC 
claimed its seat at the UN. 
 
7.2. Observation period: 1971-1980 
When the PRC joined the UN it was still inactive in peacekeeping and 
refusing to contribute. (International Crisis Group 2009, 4) One reason 
could be the ideological disagreement with the US and USSR. (He 
2007: 17) 
 
Another reason could be China’s domestic problems. The year 1971 
was marked by the ongoing aftermath of Cultural Revolution (wenhua 
da geming 文化大革命 ) 20  and the death of a prominent military 
officer Lin Biao (林彪) under unexplained circumstances, following 
his plot to kill Mao Zedong (毛泽东). (Fairbank 2010, 442) China 
lacked both material and human resources during the aftermath (He 
2007: 19) and had other concerns. 
 
In addition, China was still a newcomer in the UN and as such was not 
familiar with the complex system, including the structures, 
procedures, customs or political environment. (Ibid.) 
 
Whatever the reason, China still condemned and opposed all UNPKO, 
refused to contribute and abstained from UNSC voting (He 2007: 17), 
or rather invented a new voting style. 
 




 There have been historical discussions whether the end of the Cultural Revolution 
was the official end or the end of the Gang of Four (si ren bang 四人帮) era. For the 
purpose of this thesis I have decided to present the official end. 
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The Chinese new voting style is called “fifth voting style”. Until then, 
it had been a custom to choose one of four voting manners at the 
UNSC: 
a) (being present and) voting for 
b) (being present and) voting against 
c) (being present and) absent from voting 
d) being absent and refusing to participate in voting 
 
The PRC, however, came up with the fifth possibility: being present to 
the UNSC voting process yet not participate in the voting
21
. This 
practice continued into the 1980s and allowed the PRC to honour the 
principle of non-interference and maintain its good relations with 
developing countries
22
. (International Crisis Group 2009: 4) 
 
7.3. Change in voting behaviour and paying dues: 1981-1987 
A significant shift in China’s policy towards UNPKO was launched 
on 14 December 1981 when the UNSC unanimously, i.e. including the 
PRC, extended the UN Peacekeeping Mission on Cyprus (known as 
UNFICYP). (United Nations Security Council 1981) As the 
International Crisis Group (2009: 5) reminds, prior to the vote, the 
Chinese representative declared, in consideration of “the changes in 
the international arena and the evolution of the role of UN 
peacekeeping operations”: 
 
“From now on, the Chinese government will actively consider 
and support such UN peacekeeping operations as are 
conducive to the maintenance of international peace and 




 This enabled Chinese diplomats to gain experience without having to get involved 
and taking responsibility for international affairs 
22
 Moreover, China felt indebted to a certain extent to other developing countries for 
their help in restoring its seat at the UN. (International Crisis Group 2009: 4) 
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security and to the preservation of the sovereignty and 
independence of the states concerned in strict conformity with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter.” (United Nations 
1981) 
 
China had refrained from the “fifth voting style” and became arguably 
more active. Even though that the PRC was mostly abstaining, it 
started to provide reasons. (He 2007: 20) 
 
China started paying peacekeeping dues in 1982 (International Crisis 
Group 2009, 5) and sent a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to 
study peacekeeping operations the same year. (Pang 2005: 90 quoted 
in International Crisis Group 2009: 5) 
 
In 1981 it had been ten years since the PRC claimed its seat at the UN 
and China sure gathered some experience about the whole 
organisation system, procedures, and customs. The Chinese leadership 
meanwhile reconsidered its opinion about the UN regime and realised 
there had been political benefits to be reaped from active participation 
in the UN, including UNPKO. Nevertheless, China was still focused 
primarily on economic development (He 2007: 21-23) and did not 
participate. 
 
7.4. Active approach and showing flexibility in own principles:  
1988-2003 
7.4.1. First steps 
A new era begun when China joined the UNGA Special Committee 
for Peacekeeping Operations
23
 in November 1988. (Xinhua 




 The task of the committee is “to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues 
relating to peacekeeping. It reports to the General Assembly on its work through the 
Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) and is comprised of 147 
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2003: under Zhongguo canyu Lianheguo weihe dashiji 中国参与联合
国维和大事记 [China part of historical records of UN peacekeeping]) 
Five months later, a Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Yu Mengjia (俞
孟嘉 ), called on the international community to give “powerful 
support” to United Nations peacekeeping. (He 2007: 24) This was a 
major shift in China’s policy towards UN peacekeeping compared to 
the preceding years. 
 
On 16 February 1989 the UNSC decided to implement a Settlement 
Proposal, which had been agreed at in 1978, in the case of Namibia, 
and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was 
thus put in operation. “Its basic mandate was to ensure that free and 
fair elections could be held in Namibia. Creating the conditions for 
such elections required UNTAG to carry out a wide variety of tasks, 
many of which went well beyond those previously undertaken by 
more traditional peacekeeping operations.” China was already among 
the personnel-contributing countries (Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations undated; Namibia – UNTAG background) for the first 
time and deployed a team of twenty military observers. 
 
7.4.2. Tiananmen incident 
PRC’s foreign policy seemed to be on a good track but then came the 
4 June 1989 when the PLA massacred students on the Tiananmen 
Square (Tian‟anmen guangchang 天安门广场)24; China consequently 
found itself in international isolation. The result was not only the 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
Member States, mostly past or current contributors to peacekeeping operations. 14 
other Member States, intergovernmental organizations and entities […] participate 
as observers.” (United Nations undated) 
24
 For non-sinologists’ convenience: This is the name of the Tiananmen Square in 
Chinese. In China, however, is the incident usually referred to as “the fourth-of-June 
incident “ (liusi shijian 六四事件) or “the Tiananmen incident” (Tian‟anmen shijian 
天安门事件), if referred to at all. 
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PRC’s top-level international connections being severed. Japan 
stopped its aid program; US put an arms embargo on the PRC, 
reduced trade and investments, and stopped issuing loans to China. 
However, the isolation did not last too long. The then US President 
Nixon paid Deng Xiaping (邓小平) an unofficial visit in Beijing the 
very same year in November, and the US Secretary of State James 
Baker met his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen (钱其琛) even two 
months earlier. (Fürst 2006: 48) 
 
The first country to lift its sanctions was Japan which re-launched the 
aid program in 1990. In 1991 the temporary international isolation 
went away almost completely. NATO needed China not to veto the 
UNSC decision to deploy an international mission to Iraq (Ibid.) and 
China, eventually abstained in the UNSC voting for the first peace 
enforcement UN operation ever, in spite of disagreeing both with Iraq 
invading Kuwait and US-led coalition attack on Iraq.  (He 2007: 28) 
China may have seen this intervention as a US-led western aggression 
that uses human rights and humanitarian help as a pretext for 
demonstration of power and imposing the Western values to any place 





The year 1991 saw also the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
China believed that it had become, as the last remaining large 
communist state, US-led onslaught’s target for peaceful evolution 
(heping yanbian 和平演变) which aimed to “overthrow the socialist 
system”. (Nelan 1991) 
 




 See the chapter 7.1. 
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“After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, China quickly adjusted its 
strategy on foreign policy so as to break international isolation, ease 
the pressure of peaceful evolution and restore a favourable 
international environment for development. Its policy on UNPKO 
during this period of time mainly served these purposes. […] China 
tried to avoid confrontation with the U.S. and other important Western 
powers and did not use its veto rights to block any UNPKO or 
relevant resolutions in the UNSC, except in the case of Guatemala in 
1997 - China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution to deploy military 
observers to verify the implementation of cease-fire agreements in 
Guatemala,” argues He (2007: 27)  
 
7.4.3. A key player 
The Cambodia case was another important milestone in development 
of Chinese role in the UNPKO. On 16 October 1991 the UNSC passed 
the Resolution 717 and established the United Nations Advance 
Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). The resolution was adopted 
unanimously and China was among the countries who expressed 
readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available. 
(United Nations Security Council 1991) The mission had mandate to 
assist the four Cambodian parties to maintain ceasefire and to initiate 
mine-awareness training of civilians. UNAMIC was replaced by 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 
March 1992. (Department of Public Information 2003: Cambodia 
UNAMIC – mandate) “The mandate given to UNTAC included 
aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free 
and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, 
the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of 
the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation 
of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period.” 
(Department of Public Information 2003: Cambodia UNTAC – 
mandate) The UNTAC mission was the first UNPKO where all five 
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permanent members of the UNSC deployed together. (He 2007: 28) 
“China played a key role in […] UNTAC, supporting the mission 
financially and politically, and sending two PLA engineering units. 
(International Crisis Group 2009: 5) China’s active approach was 
aimed mainly on improving its international image, (He 2007: 28) and, 
arguably, to protect stability in own region. 
 
7.4.4. Breaking own principles 
Another example worth noticing is Somalia. China has been, for 
various reasons, cautious to approve of anything that could be seen as 
violating any of the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence, especially 
the principles of state sovereignty or interference in state’s inner 
affairs. The serious situation in Somalia in the early 1990s called for 
intervention. Moreover, the PRC was still haunted by the Tiananmen 
Square legacy and needed to improve its image, as already suggested 
above. China voted in favour of all peace operations, including 
UNITAF and UNOSOM II, both of which adopted Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and were authorised to use force. (He 2007: 29) However, 
the Chinese representative insisted that these “prompt, strong and 
exceptional measures” would constitute an “exceptional action in view 
of the unique situation in Somalia,” namely the “long-term chaotic 
situation resulting from the present lack of a Government in Somalia.” 
(United Nations Security Council 1992 quoted in Staehle 2006: 30) It 
seems, though, that China later realised that it had bent its own 
principles too much or that wanted to send a clear message that China 
does not bend its principles easily and without consequence. Chinese 
representatives, scholars, and media expressed strong dissatisfaction 
or even regrets about the outcomes and circumstances of the Somali 
missions. (Staehle 2006: 31) Nevertheless, the unyielding adherence 




China was very well aware of the Somalia precedence and the 
potential dangers in its own domestic affairs such as those of Xinjiang 
(新疆) or Tibet (Xizang 西藏), and after all also Taiwan (台湾) 
questions. This was strongly reflected in China’s attitude towards the 
Kosovo crisis in 1998. 
 
7.4.5. Kosovo – not breaking principles 
Gill and Reilly (2000: 47) come with a claim that “China’s initial 
priority was to resist UN involvement in what it dubbed a domestic 
dispute, despite the obvious regional security and humanitarian 
implications.” The Chinese representative to the UNSC Shen Guofang 
(沈国放) addressed the problem: 
 
“The Chinese delegation is concerned about the current 
situation in Kosovo, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Kosovo is an integral part of the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The question of Kosovo is, in its 
essence, an internal matter of the Federal Republic. It should 
be  resolved  properly  through negotiations between both 
parties concerned on the basis of  the  principle  of  respect  
for  the  sovereignty  and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. […]We do not think that the situation 
in Kosovo endangers regional and international peace and 
security. […] On the one hand, the legitimate rights and 
interests of all ethnic groups should be protected; on the other, 
secessionist activities by various extremist elements should be 
prevented. Many countries in the region are multiethnic. If the 
Council is to get involved in a dispute without a request from 
the country concerned, it may set a bad precedent and have 




The speech clearly reflects Chinese concerns for a “bad precedence”, 
which added to the Somalia case, could cause serious domestic 
troubles. China has been proudly referring to itself as a multi-ethnic 
country. It may have been afraid that if it had approved of an 
international intervention on the basis of ethnic violence, and similar 
intervention could be proposed to be taken on PRC’s territories. By 
denouncing interfering in state’s inner affairs, China got in a more or 




NATO eventually had dismissed the UN authority to decide on threats 
to international peace and stability, when to undertake humanitarian 
intervention, and started the air strikes (Gill and Reilly 2000: 47) 
which raised China’s worries. The worries, and objections, were 
intensified by NATO bombing PRC Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 
1998. (Ibid.: 48) 
 
The climax of the era of China breaking its principles comes with the 
crisis at East Timor. 
 
7.4.6. Shift in approach 
East Timor used to be a Portugal colony since the 16
th
 century. In 
1974 Portugal acknowledged the right of its colonial territories to self-
determination, including independence. This was followed by violent 
clashes between groups favouring independence and those favouring 
integration into Indonesia which invaded East Timor in 1975 and 
annexed it a year later. The UN did not recognise this integration, 
though.  On 27 January 1999 the Indonesian President Habibie 
indicated that he might be prepared to consider East Timor’s 
independence. On 11 June the UNSC passed the resolution 1246 and 




 See the chapter 2.2. 
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established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to 
organise and conduct “popular consultation” on independence or 
autonomy and oversee the transition period. (Department of Public 
Information 2002, East Timor – UNTAET background) China 
contributed observers for the elections. (Gill and Reilly 2000: 49) But 
after 78.5 % of voters expressed their wish for independence, pro-
integration militias launched a campaign of violence, looting and 
arson throughout the entire territory. The UNSC promptly authorised 
the International Force in East Timor, led by Australia, to restore 
peace and security and to protect UNAMET. On 25 October the 
UNSC established the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNATET) as an integrated, multidimensional 
peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of 
East Timor in the transition period. (Department of Public Information 
2002, East Timor – UNTAET background) The mission was 
authorised “to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate”, i.e. to 
use force. (United Nations Security Council 1999) 
 
China’s attitude was almost opposite to that the PRC held on the 
Kosovo issue despite similar circumstances and open foreign 
intervention. A senior representative Qin Huasun ( 秦 华 孙 ) 
emphasised that “the issue of East Timor must be solved through the 
United Nations” and expressed China’s readiness for support. (Gill 
and Reilly 2000: 49) 
 
What caused China to almost completely change its rhetoric within 
such a short time span? Firstly, East Timor is considerably closer to 
Chinese domestic sphere of influence and the spillover effect could 
have negative implications for the regional stability, which could harm 




Secondly, after the failed negotiations in Kosovo and NATO 
intervention, the PRC leadership was concerned about UN, and thus 
China’s, diminished influence, or wanted to respond in some way to 
anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. (Ibid.: 48-50) 
 
“In January 2002, China sent 15 civilian police in two batches 
to UNTAET. This was the first time that China sent civilian 
police on UNPKO. As UNTAET was a Chapter VII mission, 
Chinese police officers were authorized to carry light weapons 
and patrol the community of a foreign country. In other words, 
compared with its reluctance to compromise in the case of 
Somalia in the early 1990s, China for the first time signalled 
that an UNPKO with an enforcement-featured mandate like 
that of UNTAET could be politically acceptable.” (He 
2007: 31) 
 
Not to abandon its principles entirely, China demanded the 
acquiescence of the Indonesian government for the UNPKO 
deployment, (Gill and Reilly 2000: 48) 
 
7.5. Increasing and expanding contributions: 2003-2015 
The International Crisis Group (2009: 6), referring to the UN 
peacekeeping statistics, points out that the year 2003 started rapid 
growth in China’s contributions to peacekeeping operations. Starting 
with a contribution of 120 military and police personnel, the number 
raised to 359 a year later. By the end of 2008, China had 2146 officers 
and soldiers, “including military observers, liaison officials, staff 
officers and engineering officers […].” As of 31 July 2015, China had 
3078 peacekeepers deployed (161 policemen, 30 military experts and 
2887 troops) to ten out of sixteen peacekeeping operations, ranking 
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eighth among personnel-contributing countries
27
 and first among the 
UNSC permanent members. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
2015: Troop and police contributors – contributions by country, and 
Missions detailed by country) As far as assessed contributions are 
concerned, the PRC has ranked sixth, behind other UNSC permanent 
members and Japan. The Chinese share has been 6.64 % in the years 
2013 – 2015. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014) 
 
In April 2004, China dispatched a police contingent to the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo. This represented another significant 
change in attitude.
28
 In September, the PRC sent its first formed police 
unit to United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). 
(International Crisis Group 2009: 6) 
 
The dispatch to Haiti was a breakthrough in two ways. Firstly, this 
was the first time China sent a whole unit. He (2007: 33) claims that 
unlike contingents divided and mixed with personnel from other 
countries, “the FPU [formed police unit] has strong operational 
capabilities and can perform various duties that generally neither 
individual police officers nor military troops can/should do.” I believe 
that there are two possible factors supporting this claim: it is quite 
probable that the policemen are colleagues before being dispatched to 
a mission and that they are therefore used to cooperating with each 
other; additionally, since the unit was composed of Chinese only, the 
language barrier was diminished. Chinese troops are known for poor 
language skills. “The one area where they are often hampered is 
language and English in particular. On a day-to-day basis they operate 
well in missions, but during meetings and planning, they can’t 




 The personnel most-contributing country to 31 July 2015 is Bangladesh with 9383 
peacekeepers in total. 
28
 See the previous chapter. 
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contribute much. I imagine they could make useful contributions, 
were it not for this language barrier,” noted a UN official. 
(International Crisis Group 2009: 7) 
 
Secondly, as He (2007: 33) brings to attention, “this was […] the first 
time China sent peacekeepers to a UN member state with which it did 
not have diplomatic relations,” i.e. to a state that had diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. Until then, China usually had used UNPKO as 
a tool in its efforts to diplomatically isolate the Republic of China, as 
seen when the PRC blocked the mission to Guatemala, blocked 
extending the mission in Macedonia (Staehle 2006: 56) or threatened 
to block a mission to Liberia. (International Crisis Group 2009: 18) 
 
In November 2007 the then Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno appreciated China’s 
growing involvement but also said that it could contribute even more, 
particularly in the area of “force enablers”, where it has already 
provided medical and engineering units. He added that he would like 
to see a Chinese infantry battalion and air transport units one day. (UN 
News Centre 2007) 
 
The arguably most important change has come in 2013. On 25 April 
that year the UNSC issued the Resolution 2100 and established the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA) to support political processes in the country and 
carry out a number of security-related tasks. (Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations undated, MINUSMA mandate) 
 
“The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities 
of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation 
of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population 
centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, 
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human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of 
displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the 
preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.” (Ibid.) 
 
This was the first time when China dispatched actual security forces. 
(Wong 2013) To 31 July 2015, the PRC has contributed 402 
contingent troops. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2015, 
Missions detailed by country) 
 
Deploying combat troops to MINUSMA did set a precedence. The 
UNSC passed resolution 1996 and established the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) on 8 July 2011 to support the 
government in peace consolidation and to help manage the 
deteriorated humanitarian situation. (Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations undated, UNMISS background) China followed the trend 
of increased contributions and deployed a whole infantry battalion to a 
UNPKO for the first time (CCTV.com 2015) and thus set a new 








The PRC’s role and attitude of towards UN peacekeeping has changed 
rapidly over the past sixty-six years since its establishment: from sheer 
antagonism to open and active support. It has been a long road with 
many twists and turns, though. 
 
At first, the PRC, as a UN non-member and Maoist country, 
denounced and condemned UN as an imperialistic project of the two 
superpowers and refused to take any part. Additionally, it was afraid 
that peacekeeping operations could set an example which could 
threaten its territorial integrity. China had been therefore adhering to 
the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence which showed firm 
ideological opposition to any foreign intervention. China also lacked 
resources to participate. 
 
The first changes came with Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1970s. China, 
in need of modernisation, started opening to the world and carefully 
observed UN practice.  
 
In early 1980s China took a step forward and refrained from the fifth-
voting style. Despite abstaining from UNSC voting, it started to 
provide reasons for doing so, and started contributing into UN 
peacekeeping fund. 
 
In 1988 China definitely got actively involved with UNPKO. It joined 
the UNGA Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations and 
contributed personnel for the first time a year later. China seemed to 
be gaining confidence and slowly merging into the international 
community but faced a huge setback after the Tiananmen incident. 
However, the setback did not last long. This was arguably the first 
time when China used its UNSC position to achieve its goals and 




The PRC started getting more and more involved again, even at the 
cost of partial abandoning its principles. China presumably believed 
that its position is strong enough and does not need to be afraid of 
international intervention on its territory too much. 
 
Ideology and principles have played an important role in China’s 
behaviour in international politics in general and UN peacekeeping 
naturally as well. The core principles mostly are mutual respect for 
state sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference in state’s inner 
affairs. The PRC leadership has shown reluctance to abandon them 
but also willingness to refrain if having a motivation strong enough – 
such as getting from international isolation after the Tiananmen 
incident, worries about China’s diminishing influence or threats to its 
strategic interests. As a result, the PRC was changing its position to 
following own principles from positive to negative back and forth. 
 
Apart to the weakening influence of ideological principals, the facts 
that China has large population, limited resources and an economy 
dependant on foreign trade, as well as strategic supplies under 
possible threat, play an important factor in shaping China’s UNPKO 
behaviour as well. A hypothetical harm to Chinese energy security or 
economy could escalate into social unrests or even challenging the 
CPC’s authority which is obviously not in the leadership’s interest. 
UNPKO represent an effective tool of preventing any of these 
happening. 
 
China’s changing role has been determined mostly by its development 
and strategic needs. Seeing the growing national strength and 
confidence, assessed and personnel contributions, and above all 
combat troops going hand in hand with gradual breach of own 
principles, I assume that China will be playing bigger and bigger role 
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in UNPKO and that China will be deploying more troops in general. 
Eventually, the air transport units will be deployed as well – when the 
time will be convenient for China. The growing participation is not 
necessarily a bad thing though: China has huge human and material 
resources and potential to be a major contributor to the world peace. 
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